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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
KJELD VICTORIO GUGLIELME'ITI 
' Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
JOHN W. TURNER, Warden, Utah 
State Prison, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
12600 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the denial of the petition of 
Kjeld Victorio Gulgielmetti, for a writ of habeas corpus, 
and the order thereof. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Kjeld Victorio Guglielmetti was charged with two 
separate counts of unlawfully selling a narcotic drug, 
to-wit: Cannabis Sativa, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-13a-2 (1953). The appellant pied guilty to one charge 
(the other charge was dismissed) and Guglielmetti was 
sentenced to serve the indeterminate term as provided 
by law for the offense. Guglielmetti petitioned the Third 
District Court for the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, 
for a writ of habeas corpus which was denied. This appeal 
is from said order of the Court denying the petition. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The State submits that the decision of the District 
Court should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The State adopts Guglielmetti's Statement of Facts, 
except as hereinafter set forth. 
The appellant, Guglielmetti was not nineteen years 
old as alleged in his brief but was twenty-four years old 
at the time he entered his plea. 
Further, there is no evidence except for the unsup-
ported allegations of the appellant to suggest that the 
appellant was ignorant of the possible prison sentence he 
could receive for selling a narcotic drug, but there is evi-
dence showing that Guglielmetti thoroughly discussed the 
matter with his attorney and was aware of the possibility 
of a prison sentence for the felony (R. 29, 30). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
GUGLIELMETTI VOLUNTARILY AND IN-
TELLIGENTLY ENTERED A GU IL TY 
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PLEA, WHICH THE RECORD AFFIRMA-
TIVELY SHOWS, AND GUGLIELMETTI 
HAS FAILED TO SHOW THE TRIAL 
COURT'S DECISION TO DENY HIS PETI-
TION WAS INCORRECT. 
The United States Supreme Court has clearly held 
that before a state accepts a guilty plea, the court must 
determine whether the plea was voluntarily and intelli-
gently entered. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238, 89 S. 
Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969), Parker v. North Caro-
lina, 397 U.S. 790, 90 S. Ct. 1474, 25 L. Ed. 2d 785 (1970), 
and North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U. S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 
27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970). Further, the record must affirma-
tively show that the plea was entered voluntarily and in-
telligently, see Boykin v. Alabama, supra. On these re-
quirements the state fully agrees with Guglielmetti. 
However, the State disagrees with Guglielmetti's con-
tention that there is insufficient information in the tran-
script of hls arraignment to affirmatively show that his 
guilty plea was voluntarily and intelligently entered, and 
the State asserts that the denial of his writ by the Third 
District Court for Salt Lake County, was correct. 
It is important to note that a habeas corpus proceed-
ing is a civil matter and the trial court's findings are pre-
sumed to be correct on appeal and evidence is to be sur-
veyed in the light most favorable to the trial court's find-
ings and judgment. See, Brown v. Turner, 21 U. 2d 96, 
440 P. 2d 968 (1968), Maxwell v. Turner, 20 U. 2d 163, 
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435 P. 2d 287 (1967). The trial court had a full hearing 
and Guglielmetti had his opportunity to present his evi-
dence to show his plea was not voluntarily and intelli-
gently entered. Utah law is also clear that at trial the 
petitioner has the burden to prove facts which will entitle 
him to relief. See, Larrabee v. Turner, 25 U. 2d 248, 480 
P. 2d 134 (1971) and Johnson v. Turner, 24 U. 2d 439, 
473 P. 2d 901 (1970). After Guglielmetti's hearing the 
trial court made, inter alia, these specific findings: 
"5. There is no evidence that petitioner's 
withdrawal of his plea of not guilty or his entrance 
of a guilty plea was not voluntary (sic) and un-
derstandingly made. 
6. Petitioner has failed to sustain his burden 
of proof in support of his contention that his guilty 
plea was not voluntary (sic) and understandingly 
entered." 
In examining the record, the state asserts that the 
transcript of Guglielmetti's arraignment affirmatively 
shows his plea was freely entered and is sufficient evi-
.depce to justify the denial of his writ of habeas corpus 
by the trial court. 
Guglielmetti had two charges of unlawful sale of a 
narcotic drug pending against him. The defendant with 
the advice of his attorney desired to change his plea from 
not guilty to guilty, and before accepting his guilty plea, 
Guglielmetti's attorney asked his client several questions 
which affirmatively show that Guglielmetti voluntarily 
and intelligently changed his plea: 
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"THE COURT: The record may show that 
the defendant, Kjeld Victorio Guglielmetti, is 
present, and that the case is set for trial this 
morning: Number 22607, that he is represented 
by his attorney Sumner J. Hatch; that the State 
is represented by Richard Shepherd; that there 
is also another case pending, Case Number 22608 
on another charge of unlawfully selling a narcotic 
drug. And the record may also show that we have 
a jury and are ready for trial on the 22607. 
Do you have some other disposition that you 
wish to make? 
MR. HATCH: I would like to make a record 
before we do. 
I understand, Mr. Guglielmetti, that both of 
these charges, that you are charged with sale of a 
narcotic drug, to-wit: cannabis sativa, marijuana. 
One being charged on May 4th, and one being 
charged on May the 26th; both being charges of 
sale to one Ronald Baker. Do you understand 
that? 
MR. GUGLIELMETTI: Yes. 
MR. HATCH: Do you understand, though, 
that the charges you are charged with under our 
present law are felonies? 
MR. GUGLIELMETTI: Right. 
MR. HATCH: And conviction, or plea of 
guilty to either, or to both could result in your 
incarceration in the State Prison? 
MR. GUGLIELMETTI: Right. 
MR. HATCH: And you also understand that 
the Court has some discretion in this matter in a 
probationary basis as to probation and condition? 
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Now, as has been indicated the State on a 
plea of guilty to one of the charges, would be will-
ing to move the Court to dismiss the other charge 
which is discretionary of the Court. Do you un~ 
derstand that? 
MR. GUGLIELME'I'TI: Yes. 
MR. HATCH: You and I have talked the 
matter over thoroughly together on the matter of 
the type of disposition, is that correct? 
MR. GUGLIELMETTI: Yes. 
MR. HATCH: And is it your desire to change 
your plea with regard to the sale that is alleged 
to have been made to Ronald Baker on the 4th 
day of May of 1970? 
MR. GUGLIELME'I'TI: Yes, I am. 
MR. HATCH: Do you understand that there 
are no promises, and we could make no promises 
of what the Judge would do in the way of sen-
tencing? It's entirely within his discretion? 
MR. GUGLIELMETTI: Yes. 
MR. HATCH: Is there anything more the 
Court feels he should be advised of? 
THE COURT: I think not. On the charge of 
Case Number 22608 we have heretofore entered a 
plea of not guilty. Do you withdraw that plea? 
MR. GUGLIELMETTI: Yes. 
THE COURT: And do you enter a plea of 
guilty to that charge? 
MR. GUGLIELMETTI: Yes. 
THE COURT: The plea of guilty is entered" 
(See R. 28, 29). (Emphasis added.) 
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Guglielmetti knew that he was pleading guilty to a 
felony which could result in his incarceration in the State 
Prison (R. 28) and he admitted that he had thoroughly 
discussed the matter with his attorney before entering 
his plea of guilty (R. 29). This is amply shown in the 
record and from this evidence it is clear that his plea was 
intelligently entered. 
The United States Supreme Court has made clear 
that when an accused is represented by a competent at-
torney and upon the advice of his counsel pleads guilty, 
the plea is deemed to be intelligently entered even if 
counsel may have misjudged the strength of the prosecu-
tion's case. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U. S. 759, 90 
S. Ct. 1441, 25 L. Ed. 2d 763 (1970). 
Guglielmetti also answered that it was his desire to 
change his plea to guilty and admitted that no promises 
were being made to him (R. 29). There is no evidence 
suggesting that Guglielmetti's plea was involuntary, but 
the appellant asserts that plea bargaining by the prose-
cutor extirpates the voluntariness of his plea. 
Guglielmetti was charged with two separate crimes, 
one committed on May 4, 1970 and the other committed 
on May 26, 1970. The offense committed on May 26, 1970 
involved a much larger quantity ($3,000 worth) (R. 24) 
of narcotic drugs than did the offense committed on May 
4, 1970. It seems apparent that after reviewing the evi-
dence against him, Guglielmetti felt his best strategy 
would be to plead guilty to the one charge with the knowl-
edge that the state would move to dismiss the other 
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charge. (The court subsequently dismissed the second 
charge) (R. 30). Apparently Guglielmetti and his coun-
sel believed that he had a good chance to be put on pro-
bation (see R. 28) rather than sentenced, so in view o! 
all the circumstances and with the advice of his counsel 
' 
Guglielmetti elected to change his plea to guilty. 
After receiving a report from the Adult Probation 
and Parole Department the trial court sentenced Gugliel-
metti to the indeterminate sentence as provided by law 
(R. 25) rnther than placing him on probation as Gugliel-
metti and his attorney had hoped the court would do. 
Courts have recognized that plea bargaining is a com· 
mon and an acceptable practice in criminal law. In 
United States v. Brady, 397 U. S. 742, 753, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 
25 L. Ed. 2d 747 (1970) the Court said: 
" ... But we cannot hold that it is unconsti· 
tutional for the State to extend a benefit to a 
defendant who in turn extends a substantial bene· 
fit to the State and who demonstrates by his plea 
that he is ready and willing to admit his crime 
and to enter the correctional system in a frame of 
mind that affords hope for success in rehabilita· 
tion over a shorter period of time than might other· 
wise be necessary." 
The Utah Supreme Court has also considered whether 
a plea is voluntarily made when a defendant with multiple 
charges against him enters a plea of guilty which results 
in the other charges being dismissed. In Strong v. Turner, 
22 Utah 2d 294, 296, 452 P. 2d 323 (1969) the court 
stated: 
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" ... the mere fact that a defendant, against 
w~om there are multiple charges pending, pleads 
guilty to one of them on the condition that the 
others be dropped certainly does not in and of 
itself compel a finding of coercion." 
It is clear that plea bargaining is a legal option avail-
able to a prosecutor and an accused, and the mere fact 
that one pleads guilty with the promise of the state's 
motion to dismiss other charges does not render a guilty 
plea involuntary. 
It is conceded that both Guglielmetti and his at-
torney were hopeful that he would be placed on proba-
tion rather than receive a prison sentence, but the record 
affirmatively shows that Guglielmetti's attorney, Mr. 
Hatch, advised the defendant that a plea of guilty could 
result in a prison sentence and that probation was solely 
within the discretion of the trial court and that no prom-
ise had been made or could be made on what the judge 
would do in the way of sentencing (R. 28, 29). With 
this in mind Guglielmetti plead guilty and was subse-
quently sentenced. The fact that the defendant, and his 
attorney had overestimated his chances for probation and 
were disappointed when a prison term was prescribed 
cannot now be used to thwart a voluntary plea, unless 
the advice of his counsel was so incompetent as to amount 
to gross error. See McMann v. Richardson, supra, and 
Kryger v. Turner, 25 U. 2d 214, 479 P. 2d 477 (1971). 
Surely the record demonstrates that no promise of pro-
bation was received and the advice given to the defendant 
that probation is in the discretion of the trial court was 
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factually true and is not misleading or incompetent. The 
appellant has utterly failed to show in what regard the 
mentioning of probation, with the accompanying expla-
nation, prejudiced or reduced the voluntary nature of Im 
plea.. 
The appellant appears to assert that the failure of 
the trial court to mention the maximum and minimum 
terms provided by law for a guilty plea is so prejudicial 
that a guilty plea cannot be deemed to be voluntary in 
their absence. While the record does not specifically men· 
tion the maximum and minimum terms for selling nar· 
cotic drugs, the record does disclose that Guglielmetti was 
advised that his guilty plea could result in a prison sen· 
tence (R. 28), the record also discloses that Guglielmetti 
knew he was pleading guilty to a felony (R. 28), and the 
record further discloses that Guglielmetti had thoroughly 
discussed the disposition of the matter with his attorney 
(R. 29) . There is more than adequate evidence to thus 
uphold the trial court's finding that his plea was volun-
tarily and intelligently entered, and except for the appel-
lant's assertion, there is no evidence suggesting that he 
was ignorant of the length of the prison term for this 
offense. In view of the extensive experience of his at-
torney and of the admissions in the record that he had 
thoroughly discussed the matter and that he knew he 
was pleading guilty to a felony which could result in a 
prison sentence the trial court was justified in its findings, 
and there is no reason to reverse their decision on appeal. 
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POINT IL 
GUGLIELMETTI'S CONTENTION THAT 
THE SENTENCING JUDGE WAS UN-
AWARE HE COULD GRANT PROBATION 
TO GUGLIELMETTI IS WITHOUT MERIT 
IN VIEW OF THE EVIDENCE IN THE REC-
ORD WHICH JUSTIFIED THE SPECIFIC 
FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT REJECT-
ING THIS CONTENTION. 
As has been previously noted the burden of proving 
facts sufficient t.o issue a writ of habeas corpus is upon 
the petitioner, and when the trial court denies a petition 
its findings are presumed t.o be correct. 
After a full hearing the trial court made the follow-
ing finding of fact: 
"7. There is no evidence that the sentencing 
judge was unaware of the fact that he could grant 
the petitioner probation or that the sentencing 
judge desired t.o or would have granted such pro-
bation." 
Under Utah law the trial court has the discretion to 
grant probation where "it appears compatible with the 
public interest." See, Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-17 (1953). 
After pleading "guilty" Guglielmetti agreed t.o waive his 
right t.o be sentenced within ten days in order that a re-
port from the Adult Probation and Parole Department be 
prepared (R. 30). At sentencing, counsel for Guglielmetti 
appealed to the court t.o disregard what he must have 
felt t.o be a derogat.ory report (see R. 29). The court 
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indicated it examined the report (R. 25) and the court at 
no place indicated it felt probation should be granted. 
There is no evidence suggesting the trial court was under 
misapprehension that it could not grant probation if it 
so desired, but rather the record indicates that the court 
did not feel probation should be granted in view of the 
Adult Probation and Parole report (R. 24, 25). 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully submits that Guglielmetti had 
a full opportunity to prove the allegedly unconstitutional 
entry of his guilty plea in the court below and following 
a full hearing his petition was denied. On appeal Gugliel· 
metti has failed to show error on the part of the district 
court. Accordingly it is urged that the district court's 
decision should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
DAVID S. YOUNG 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
